Impending legal challenges facing the National Popular Vote Compact
Back in March, I wrote here at ELB, “Could the National Popular Vote Compact take effect by July 20, 2028?” I posited that new state legislative and gubernatorial Democratic trifectas in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Nevada, and Arizona could make the NPV viable. Subsequent pieces by Jason Willick in the Washington Post in April, and a deep dive in May by Vox on both the legal and practical consequences, ensued.
All five of those states have Democratic trifectas, and the math means some combination of those four, or all five, might bring the NPV into existence. Rick H. links to the New York Times piece on this, but Axios, USA Today, and others are exploring it.
For many years the National Popular Vote Compact has been something of an amusing academic discussion. But this sudden reality puts the very real legal consequences in plain view. (There are major political economy questions about whether the last state needed to make it effective would actually do so, but that’s a separate question. We’ll know a lot by June 2027, given how some legislatures operate on a part-time basis.)
I can hardly summarize the many, many legal and practical questions that arise (some of which are discussed in the above links). For a robust defense of the NPV, the National Popular Vote website is the best place to start. For opposition, Save Our States. I’ll just highlight the high points of the future legal challenges, some of which might need to occur on a very compressed time frame depending on what states do.
First, as I wrote 20 (!) years ago (and later here), I think the Compact requires congressional consent. Supporters argue both the Compact doesn’t need consent and that it will try to get congressional consent anyway. I think the stronger claim is also that compacts face a presidential veto, as has occurred in the past, a further barrier for implementation in 2028. (Of course, it simply delays implementation, subject to the other concerns enumerated below and elsewhere.)
Second, the Constitution provides, “Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors.” The “state” is the who, and the “legislature” is the how. As Professor Norman Williams has put it, “it is simply inconceivable that the framers thought that they were empowering the states to appoint their electors in accordance with popular sentiment outside the state.” The metaphor I’ve used is this: it is hard to say the “state” has “appointed” the electors if it were to outsource the appointment to a popular election in France, even if that is the manner the legislature has chosen. In short, the state itself must appoint, and appointment with reference to actions outside the state is inconsistent with Article II.
Third, the NPV combines voters subject to very different voting rules into a single cohort, an Equal Protection Clause violation, as it treats similarly-situated voters arbitrarily different. Incarcerated felons can vote in some states, but not others. The Green Party candidate will be on the ballot in some states, but not others. As I wrote here and here, no one would allow a statewide election to occur with such wild disparities between the treatment of voters in the same election. The same holds true for a nationwide popular vote.
Fourth, state constitutions typically expressly restrict voter eligibility to in-state residents. The NPV purports to hold a state election to award presidential electors on the basis of votes cast by both in-state and out-of-state residents. After Moore v. Harper, as I wrote in 2023, I think the state constitution can bind the state legislature, and the state legislature cannot approve voting for out-of-staters.
Importantly, supporters of the NPV have to win every one of these legal arguments for the Compact to take effect.
There are other issues, but, to me, these are the high points. These legal points, and others, could be (and are!) full-length law review articles.
Again, there will be plenty written about it in the ensuing months, and I encourage people to review both the pro- and anti-sites above for much more comprehensive views.